Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting

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dc.contributor.author Deya, Palash
dc.contributor.author Misra, Neeldhara
dc.contributor.author Narahari, Y.
dc.date.accessioned 2018-04-10T10:04:19Z
dc.date.available 2018-04-10T10:04:19Z
dc.date.issued 2018-03
dc.identifier.citation Deya, Palash; Misra, Neeldhara and Narahari, Y.,"Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting", Theoretical Computer Science, DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2018.03.012, Mar. 2018. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0304-3975
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2018.03.012
dc.identifier.uri https://repository.iitgn.ac.in/handle/123456789/3580
dc.description.abstract The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators. While this assumption is reasonable for purposes of showing intractability, it is unrealistic for algorithmic considerations. In most real-world scenarios, it is impractical to assume that the manipulators to have accurate knowledge of all the other votes. In this work, we investigate manipulation with incomplete information. In our framework, the manipulators know a partial order for each voter that is consistent with the true preference of that voter. In this setting, we formulate three natural computational notions of manipulation, namely weak, opportunistic, and strong manipulation. We say that an extension of a partial order is viable if there exists a manipulative vote for that extension. We propose the following notions of manipulation when manipulators have incomplete information about the votes of other voters. 1. Weak Manipulation: the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in at least one extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators. 2. Opportunistic Manipulation: the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in every viable extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators. 3. Strong Manipulation: the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in every extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators. We consider several scenarios for which the traditional manipulation problems are easy (for instance, Borda with a single manipulator). For many of them, the corresponding manipulative questions that we propose turn out to be computationally intractable. Our hardness results often hold even when very little information is missing, or in other words, even when the instances are very close to the complete information setting. Our results show that the impact of paucity of information on the computational complexity of manipulation crucially depends on the notion of manipulation under consideration. Our overall conclusion is that computational hardness continues to be a valid obstruction to manipulation, in the context of a more realistic model.
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Palash Deya, Neeldhara Misra and Y.Naraharic
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.subject Voting en_US
dc.subject Manipulation en_US
dc.subject Incomplete information en_US
dc.subject Algorithm en_US
dc.subject Computational complexity en_US
dc.title Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.relation.journal Theoretical Computer Science


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