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  • Deya, Palash; Misra, Neeldhara; Narahari, Y. (Elsevier, 2018-03)
    The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein the manipulators know the votes of ...
  • Dey, Palash; Misra, Neeldhara; Narahari, Y. (Elsevier, 2017-05)
    Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. We introduce and study two important special cases of the classical $Bribery problem, namely, Frugal-bribery and Frugal-$bribery where the ...
  • Dey, Palash; Misra, Neeldhara; Narahari, Y. (Elsevier, 2016-02)
    In the Possible winner problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences ...
  • Dey, Palash; Misra, Neeldhara; Narahari, Y. (Elsevier, 2019-04)
    Approval voting provides an opportunity for the agents to make a comment about every candidate, without incurring the overhead of determining a full ranking on the entire set of candidates. This makes approval voting a ...

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