Repository logo
  • English
  • العربية
  • বাংলা
  • Català
  • Čeština
  • Deutsch
  • Ελληνικά
  • Español
  • Suomi
  • Français
  • Gàidhlig
  • हिंदी
  • Magyar
  • Italiano
  • Қазақ
  • Latviešu
  • Nederlands
  • Polski
  • Português
  • Português do Brasil
  • Srpski (lat)
  • Српски
  • Svenska
  • Türkçe
  • Yкраї́нська
  • Tiếng Việt
Log In
New user? Click here to register.Have you forgotten your password?
  1. Home
  2. IIT Gandhinagar
  3. Computer Science and Engineering
  4. CSE Publications
  5. On the Prevalence and Usage of Commit Signing on GitHub: A Longitudinal and Cross-Domain Study
 
  • Details

On the Prevalence and Usage of Commit Signing on GitHub: A Longitudinal and Cross-Domain Study

Source
29th International Conference on Evaluation and Assessment in Software Engineering (EASE 2025)
Date Issued
2025-12-24
Author(s)
Sharma, Anupam
Karmakar, Sreyashi
Kancherla, Gayatri Priyadarsini
Bichhawat, Abhishek  
DOI
10.1145/3756681.3756959
Abstract
GitHub is one of the most widely used public code development platform. However, the code hosted publicly on the platform is vulnerable to commit spoofing that allows an adversary to introduce malicious code or commits into the repository by spoofing the commit metadata to indicate that the code was added by a legitimate user. The only defense that GitHub employs is the process of commit signing, which indicates whether a commit is from a valid source or not based on the keys registered by the users. In this work, we perform an empirical analysis of how prevalent is the use of commit signing in commonly used GitHub repositories. To this end, we build a framework that allows us to extract the metadata of all prior commits of a GitHub repository, and identify what commits in the repository are verified. We analyzed 60 opensource repositories belonging to four different domains - web development, databases, machine learning packages and security - using our framework and study the presence of verified commits in each of these repositories over five years. Our analysis shows that only ~10% of all the commits in these 60 repositories are verified. Developers committing code to security-related repositories are much more vigilant when it comes to signing commits by users. We also analyzed different Git clients for the ease of commit signing through their interfaces, and found that GitKraken provides the most convenient way of commit signing whereas GitHub Web provides the most accessible way for verifying commits. During our analysis, we also identified an unexpected behavior in how GitHub handles unverified emails in user accounts preventing legitimate owner to use the email address. We believe that the low number of verified commits may be due to lack of awareness, complicated steps for setup, and difficulty in managing multiple keys across systems. Finally, we propose ways to identify commit ownership based on GitHub's Events API addressing the issue of commit spoofing.
Publication link
https://doi.org/10.1145/3756681.3756959
URI
https://repository.iitgn.ac.in/handle/IITG2025/33954
Keywords
Commit Signing | Commit Spoofing | Git clients | GitHub
IITGN Knowledge Repository Developed and Managed by Library

Built with DSpace-CRIS software - Extension maintained and optimized by 4Science

  • Privacy policy
  • End User Agreement
  • Send Feedback
Repository logo COAR Notify